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ABSTRACT. Poorer countries are generally believed to be more vulnerable to climate
change than richer countries because poorer countries are more exposed and have
less adaptive capacity. This suggests that, in principle, there are two ways of reducing
vulnerability to climate change: economic growth andgreenhouse gas emission reduction.
Using a complex climate change impact model, in which development is an important
determinant of vulnerability, the hypothesis is tested whether development aid is more
effective in reducing impacts than is emission abatement. The hypothesis is barely
rejected for Asia but strongly accepted for Latin America and, particularly, Africa. The
explanation for the difference is that development (aid) reduces vulnerabilities in some
sectors (infectious diseases, water resources, agriculture) but increases vulnerabilities in
others (cardiovascular diseases, energy consumption). However, climate change impacts
are much higher in Latin America and Africa than in Asia, so that money spent on
emission reduction for the sake of avoiding impacts in developing countries is better
spent on vulnerability reduction in those countries.
His last big project in a long career, Jan Feenstra managed the Netherlands Climate Change
Assistance Programme through which the Dutch Government sponsors climate change research
in developing countries. He hated how climate change detracted from what he considered to be the
real issues. This paper is dedicated to his memory.
1. Introduction
It is often noted that the level of (economic) development is one of the main
determinants of vulnerability to climate change (e.g., Smith et al., 2001). The
This paper beneﬁted fromdiscussionswithHadi Dowlatabadi and TomDowning.
Three anonymous referees made constructive comments. An earlier version of
this paper was presented at the Department of Engineering and Public Policy,
CarnegieMellonUniversity, Pittsburgh, PA, on10April, 2002. The comments of the
participants are greatly appreciated. TheUSNational Science Foundation through
the Center for Integrated Study of theHumanDimensions of Global Change (SBR-
9521914) and theMichael Otto Foundation for Environmental Protection provided
welcome ﬁnancial support. All errors and opinions are mine.
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reason is twofold. First, a larger share of the economy of poorer countries
directly depends on weather and climate, for instance, in agriculture.
Second, poorer countries have less means to defend themselves against the
vagaries of theweather. As their exposure is higher, and adaptive capacity is
lower, poorer countries are more vulnerable. Global climate change impact
studies indeed conﬁrm this, although one may wonder how much of this
is ‘assumption’ and how much ‘result’.
A corollary of ‘poor is vulnerable’ is that accelerating development is a
strategy to reduce vulnerability to climate change, and – apart from the
side beneﬁts – perhaps a more effective one than reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. This point is also noted with some regularity, most notably
by Schelling (1992, 1995). However, to date, this is an assertion only. The
relative strengths of development versus emission abatement in reducing
vulnerability to climate change have yet to be quantiﬁed.
Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001) is an exception. However, that paper is
limited to malaria only, and the argument is the other way around.
Tol and Dowlatabadi use a model in which the incidence of malaria
increases with global warming and decreases with economic growth. The
model also includes international trade and investment, so that emission
reduction in the OECD negatively affects growth in developing countries,
particularly in Africa. They show that the economic growth forgone
(in developing countries) because of ambitious emission reduction (in
developed countries) would affect public health care, such that malaria
actually increases, even though climate change is less.
This paper attempts a direct comparison between the two effects. It tests
the Schelling Conjecture that money reserved for climate policy would be
better spent on development. The paper estimates the marginal costs of
climate change, and then estimates what would happen (at the margin)
to the impacts of climate change if the same amount of money were
invested in development rather than in emission abatement. Framed like
this, we also avoid the tricky issue of estimating the impacts of emission
reduction in the North on economic growth in the South (on which Tol
and Dowlatabadi rely). Although the long-term effects are considered,
the analysis is restricted to emissions and development aid in the current
decade, so that policy conclusions hold only for the present and near future.
As far as I know, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to do this.
A second difference between this paper and Tol and Dowlatabadi is
that we here consider all impacts of climate change, rather than malaria
only. Infectious diseases and development are negatively correlated: higher
income is associated with lower incidence of diseases. However, other
diseases, notably cardiovascular and respiratory disorders, are positively
correlated to income (via diet and longevity). The issue is broader than
health. Some vulnerabilities fall with income (e.g., agriculture), whereas
others rise (e.g., energy consumption). Only if we include all impacts
in a consistent way, can we genuinely investigate the trade-off between
development and emission reduction as alternativemeans to reduce climate
change vulnerability.
The literature on adaptation and mitigation strategies for climate change
is thin. Most papers assume that one is a substitute for the other, without
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looking at the interactions between adaptation and mitigation (see the
review by Toth et al., 2001). One exception is Kane and Shogren (2000),
who study the interactions from a risk perspective at a conceptual level, but
without specifying these interactions. Another exception is Tol (2004), who
focuses on the interactions in policy advice, rather than the interactions
themselves.
A study like this is necessarily built upon a large number of assump-
tions.1 These include scenarios of future developments, climate change,
climate change impacts, and the relationship between vulnerability and
development. These elements are all uncertain. Other assumptions are
not just uncertain, but also controversial. These include how different
impacts are aggregated, and how impacts are aggregated over nations and
over time. Although the model used and the underlying assumptions are
‘mainstream’, and, although sensitivities are analysed, it is clear that this
paper is only a ﬁrst attempt at a complicated subject. The results indicate
that further research in this area is worthwhile.
Section 2 presents the model used. Section 3 presents the scenarios and
the results. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
This paper uses version 2.4 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty,
Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) model.2 Parts of the model go back
to version 1.6 (see Tol, 1999a–e, 2002c). Other parts, particularly the impacts
of climate change, go back to version 2.0 (Tol, 2002a,b). Relevant for this
paper, compared with previous versions, version 2.4 has updated estimates
of the impacts of climate change. See Smith et al. (2001) and Tol et al. (2001)
for a discussion of the impacts of climate change.
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endo-
genous perturbations, speciﬁed for nine major world regions, namely
OECD-America, OECD-Europe, OECD-Paciﬁc, Central and Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union,Middle East, Latin America, South and South-
East Asia, Centrally Planned Asia, and Africa.
The model runs from 1950 to 2200, in time steps of a year. The prime
reason for extending the simulation period into the past is the necessity
to initialize the climate change impact module. In FUND, some climate
change impacts are assumed to depend on the impact of the year before,
so as to reﬂect the process of adaptation to climate change. Without a
proper initialization, climate change impacts are thusmisrepresented in the
ﬁrst decades. ‘Scenarios’ for the period 1950–1990 are based on historical
observation, viz. the IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk,
1994). The period 1990–2100 is based on the FUND scenario, which lies
somewhere in between the IS92a and IS92f scenarios (Leggett et al., 1992).
Note that the original IPCC scenarios had to be adjusted to ﬁt FUND’s
nine regions and yearly time-step. The period 2100–2200 is based on
1 Unfortunately, the number of assumptions is so great that they cannot all be
presented in full in a single paper.
2 Model code and publications can be found at http://www.uni-hamburg.de/
Wiss/FB/15/Sustainability/fund.html
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extrapolation of the population, economic, and technological trends in
2050–2100, combined with a gradual shift to a steady state of population,
economy, and technology. The model and scenarios are so far extrapolated
that the results for the period 2100–2200 are not to be relied upon. This
period is only used to provide the forward-looking agents in FUND with a
proper perspective.
The exogenous scenarios concern economic growth, population growth,
urban population, autonomous energy efﬁciency improvements, decarbo-
nization of the energy use, nitrous oxide emissions, andmethane emissions.
Incomes and population are perturbed by the impact of climate change
(Fankhauser and Tol, forthcoming). Population falls with climate change
deaths, resulting from changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and
tropical cyclones.Heat and cold stress are assumed to affect only the elderly,
non-reproductive population; heat stress only affects urban population.
Population also changes with climate-induced migration between the
regions. Economic impacts of climate change are modelled as deadweight
losses to disposable income, which in turn affect utility and investment.
Scenarios are only slightly perturbed by climate change impacts, however,
so that income and population are largely exogenous.
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of carbon dioxide emissions; the
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide;
the global mean temperature; and the impact of climate change on coastal
zones, agriculture, forestry, natural ecosystems, energy consumption, water
resources, and human health.
Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then
geometrically depleted. This is a simpliﬁed representation of the relevant
atmospheric chemistry, but sufﬁcient for our purposes. The carbon cycle is
the ﬁve-box of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987), as used by Hammitt
et al. (1992). Radiative forcing for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous
oxide are based on Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature is gov-
erned by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium,with a life-time of 50 years.
Global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5◦C for a doubling of
carbon dioxide equivalents. Global mean sea level is also geometric, with
its equilibrium determined by the temperature and a life time of 50 years.
The model is calibrated to Kattenberg et al. (1996).
The climate impact module is fully described in Tol (2002a,b) and Tol and
Heinzow (2003). The impact module has two units of measurement: people
and money. People can die prematurely and migrate. These effects, like
all other impacts, are monetized. Damage can be due to either the rate of
change or the level of change. Benchmark estimates can be found in table 1.
The benchmark estimates give the total welfare impact of a 1◦C global
warming on the current economy and population. The estimates are largely
based on direct costs; e.g., wetland impacts are based on the average value
of coastal wetlands times the total wetland area destroyed by sea level rise.
Impacts are estimated independently of each other. Benchmark estimates
as in Tol (2002a) are useful for model calibration, but not particularly
insightful, as vulnerabilities change over time and climate change will not
stop at a 1◦C warming. Marginal cost estimates, discussed below, are more
insightful.
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Table 1. Estimated impacts of a 1◦C increase in the global mean temperature; positive
numbers are gains, negative numbers are losses (Standard deviations are given in
brackets)
Billion dollar Percent of GDP
OECD-A 184 (106) 3.60 (2.07)
OECD-E 212 (116) 3.89 (2.15)
OECD-P 38 (33) 1.20 (1.06)
CEE & fSU 60 (108) 2.10 (3.78)
ME 4 (8) 1.04 (2.15)
LA −1 (5) −0.15 (0.58)
S & SEA −16 (9) −1.90 (1.13)
CPA 9 (22) 2.00 (5.01)
AFR −17 (9) −4.10 (2.21)
Source: Tol (2002a); Tol and Heinzow (2003).
Impacts of climate change on energy consumption, agriculture, and
cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that there is
a climate optimum. The climate optimum is determined by a mix of factors,
including physiology and behaviour. Impacts are positive or negative,
depending on whether climate is moving towards or away from that
optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate is further away
from the optimum climate. The optimum climate concerns the potential
impacts. Actual impacts lag behind potential impacts, depending on the
speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to the new
climate are always negative. On the other hand, CO2 fertilization positively
inﬂuences agriculture. These impacts do depend on the initial climate in
the region. See Tol (2002b) for the exact speciﬁcation.
Other impacts of climate change, on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged
ecosystems, water resources, malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis,
are modelled as simple power functions. Impacts are either negative or
positive, and do not change sign over time. These impacts are independent
of the initial climate in the region, or implicitly depend on the initial climate
through the calibration. See Tol (2002b) for the exact speciﬁcation.
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, eco-
nomic growth, and technological progress. Some systems are expected to
become more vulnerable, such as coastal zones (with population growth),
heat-related disorders (with urbanization and an aging population, and
with higher values from higher per capita incomes) and ecosystems (with
higher income and loss of biodiversity, respectively). Other systems are
projected to become less vulnerable, such as agriculture (with economic
growth) and vector-borne diseases (with improved health care). Yet other
systemsbecomebothmore and less vulnerable, suchas energy consumption
and water resources (with technology and population growth). See Tol
(2002b) for the exact speciﬁcation.
The impact functions thus have the following shape, for impacts with an
equilibrium
It = V(Dt)E(|Tt − Topt|) + ρ It−1; ∂E
∂X
> 0 (1)
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and for impacts without an equilibrium
It = V(Dt)E(Tt); ∀t ∂E
∂T
> 0 ∨ ∂E
∂T
< 0 (2)
where I denotes impact, V denotes vulnerability as a function of develop-
ment D, E denotes exposure as a function of the climate indicator(s) T, Topt
denotes the optimal climate, t denotes time, and ρ is a parameter. In (2), E
is monotone in T. V is increasing in D for ‘luxury’ impacts (cardiovascular
health problems, ecosystems) and decreasing for ‘necessary’ impacts (water
resources, agriculture). Each sector has an impact function (1) or (2). Total
impact sums over sectoral impacts; total impacts are thus highly non-linear
in development and climate change.
The impact module of FUND2.4 is based on that of FUND2.0, fully
described in Tol (2002a,b). The following changes were made, following
the logic for updating impact estimates outlined in Tol (2002a). Morbidity
was added by overlaying the changes in potential disease burdens (Marten
et al., 1997) with observed diseases patterns (Murray and Lopez, 1996);
morbidity impacts are valued based on Navrud (2001). Vulnerability is
modelled as formortality. The effects ofCO2 fertilization and climate change
on forestry and agriculturewere separated,while parameterswere updated
with more studies (IEA GHG 1999; Sohngen et al., 1996). The dynamics of
water resources, energy consumption, and ecosystem impacts were made
richer. Speciﬁcally, technological changewas introduced in thewater sector.
The linear dependence of energy consumption on climate was replaced by
a more realistic non-linear representation, reﬂection saturation of demand.
Biodiversity loss is now assumed to lead to an increase in the value of the
remaining species, using the speciﬁcation of Weitzman (1998). See Tol and
Heinzow (2003) for an extensive description of the new model; note that
the marginal impact estimates of greenhouse gas emissions are not much
affected by these changes in the model.
3. Abatement versus development
Table 2 shows the difference in the net present value of climate change
impacts due to a small change in carbon dioxide emissions3 in the period
2000–2009, normalized by that emissions change. That is, table 2 shows the
marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions, also known as the
social costs of carbon; the marginal damage costs equal the Pigou tax.
Table 2 also shows the regional distribution of the marginal damage costs.4
Western Europe, particularly its health and energy consumption, is the
3 1 million tonnes of carbon per year, while total emissions are 6 billion tonnes of
carbon per year.
4 Note that the regional distribution of total costs (table 1) and the regional
distribution of marginal costs (table 2) do not match, at least not at ﬁrst sight. This
is because, in FUND, climate change impacts are speciﬁed per sector as well as per
region. Each region and each sector hasdifferent development scenarios.Although
this obscures the estimates of marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions, this
feature of themodel does allow for estimating the effect of development on climate
change impacts.
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Table 2. Regional marginal costs of CO2 emissions and marginal beneﬁts of
development aid on climate change impacts in the period 2000–2009
Marginal costs of Marginal beneﬁts of
CO2 emissionsa development aidb Cost–beneﬁt ratioc
PRTPd 0% 1% 3% 0% 1% 3% 0% 1% 3%
OECD-A 4.04 −0.39 −3.15
OECD-E 9.07 4.10 0.40
OECD-P −4.33 −5.01 −4.39
CEE & fSU 7.65 3.41 0.31
ME −0.09 −0.15 −0.13
LA 1.10 0.66 0.25 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.9 2.3 5.2
S & SEA 0.03 −0.03 −0.06 −0.17 −0.08 −0.02 −99.9 63.9 8.1
CPA 0.01 −0.28 −0.42 −0.65 −0.41 −0.20 −1465.1 29.1 0.0
AFR 2.44 1.46 0.60 3.08 1.75 0.63 25.3 23.9 20.8
Sum 19.93 3.77 −6.59
EqW 16.13 6.59 −0.50
Notes: a Positive numbers are marginal costs, negative numbers are marginal
beneﬁts of carbon dioxide emissions.
b Positive numbers are marginal beneﬁts, negative numbers are marginal costs
of development aid; only the effects of aid on climate change impacts are
included.
c 20× ‘marginal beneﬁts of development aid’/‘marginal costs ofCO2 emissions’.
d PRTP=pure rate of time preference, or utility discount rate.
Source: Own calculations.
most vulnerable of the OECD regions; the other parts of the OECD even
substantially beneﬁt from climate change in the short run,mostly because of
reductions in cold-relatedmortality andmorbidity. The countries of Central
andEasternEurope and the former SovietUnion suffer fromclimate change,
particularly with regard to water resources. South and Southeast Asia and
China also beneﬁt from climate change, particularly in agriculture and
energy. However, Latin America and Africa are, on balance, negatively
affected, with water resources, energy consumption, and health being the
main contributors to the overall damage.
Table 2 also shows the marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions for the
whole world, using both a simple addition of dollar values and so-called
equity weights (Fankhauser et al., 1997, 1998), through which monetary
losses are corrected for their impact onutility.As the effects of current carbon
dioxide emissions will only be felt in the future, the marginal damage costs
strongly depend on the discount rate; note that table 2 speciﬁes the utility
discount rate, or pure rate of time preference.
Speeding up development may help or hinder vulnerability to climate
change. Table 2 shows by howmuch, again for development aid spent in the
period 2000–2009.5 The marginal beneﬁts of development aid are deﬁned
5 The effect of development aid is to permanently increase per capita income, by
increasing productivity. In the base speciﬁcation, one dollar spent on development
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to resemble the marginal damage costs: if a little more aid would be given,
how much would climate change impacts fall? The marginal beneﬁts of
development aid are the difference in the net present value of the impacts,
normalized by the change in development aid.
In Asia, faster development increases vulnerability, because agriculture
becomes less important – climate change affects agriculture positively –
and because heat-related cardiovascular and respiratory disorders aremore
prominent in wealthier societies. In Latin America, the health balance is
more towards poverty-related (i.e., vector-borne, infectious) diseases and
cold-related cardiovascular disorders, so that faster development reduces
vulnerability. However, the return on such investments is small: for every
dollar invested, 5–8 cents worth of avoided impacts is gained. In Africa,
investing in development does pay off, at least for low discount rates. With
a pure rate of time preference of 1 per cent (0 per cent), every invested dollar
yields a return of 175 per cent (308 per cent). For higher discount rates, the
investment is not worthwhile: an invested dollar returns 63 cents if the pure
rate of time preference equals 3 per cent.6 The climate-related beneﬁts of
faster development in Africa are dominated by human health, with energy
consumption a distant second.
The marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions and the returns to invest-
ment in development are readily compared. If climate policy is verymodest
and themarginal costs of emission reductionare only $1/tC, one candirectly
compare the marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions to the returns to
investment given in table 2. A dollar invested in emission reduction is
worth less than a dollar invested in development for Africa only; this is
regardless of the discount rate, although the effect is more pronounced for
lower discount rates. Latin America would rather see the dollar invested in
emission reduction (for all three discount rates, but this preference is less
strong for higher discount rates), whereas Asia would rather see the dollar
not invested in climate policy, except if the discount rate is very low, in
which case emission reduction would beneﬁt Asia.
If climate policy is more ambitious, running at marginal abatement costs
of $20/tC (more or less Kyoto; Buchner et al., 2002), then the returns of
investment should be multiplied by 20 before they can be compared with
the marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions. Table 2 shows the results
(‘cost–beneﬁt ratio’). Africa and, for a sufﬁciently high discount rate, Latin
America would beneﬁt more, in climate change impact terms, from a dollar
invested in development than from a dollar invested in emission reduction.
Asia would rather not see any such investment, but a dollar invested in
emission reduction does less harm than a dollar invested in development.
aid leads to a 5 cents increase in GDP in the beneﬁciary country. Easterly (2002),
among many others, makes it clear that this speciﬁcation is simplistic, without
offering a more realistic, generic relationship between aid and development.
6 Although consumption discount rates are generally higher in developing
countries than in developed countries, there is no a priori reason to assume the
same would hold for the utility discount rate or pure rate of time preference. A
pure rate of time preference of 3 per cent seems to describe economic behaviour
best (Arrow et al., 1996).
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Figure 1. The net present welfare gains (discounted to 2000 at 1 per cent a year)
of 10 million metric tonnes of emission reduction between 2000 and 2009, and an
additional transfer of 38, 18, and 21 million US dollar between 2000 and 2009 to four
developing regions, distributed proportional to population (pop) or regional marginal
costs of carbon dioxide emissions (mc)
If, however, a dollar invested in development only brings 5 cents worth of
growth stimulus, then one should multiply the cost–beneﬁt ratio in table 2
by 0.05; that is, directly compare the marginal costs of emission reduction
with the marginal beneﬁts of development aid (see previous paragraph).7
Of the four developing regions, Africa is the largest contributor to
the worldwide marginal impacts of climate change. South and Southeast
Asia and China have positive, but small marginal impacts, while Latin
America’smarginal impacts are intermediate andnegative.Any investment
in greenhouse gas emission reduction on behalf of the developing countries
is thus to a large extent on behalf of Africa. Africa, however, would rather
see the money invested in development, even from the narrow perspective
of reducing climate change impacts.
Figure 1 shows the effects on net present welfare (not just associated
with climate change impacts) of a arbitrary but small emission reduction of
10million tonnes of carbon8 and three ‘equivalent’ transfers of development
aid. In the ﬁrst transfer, emission reduction is assumed to cost $3.8/tC9, and
$38 million in development aid is distributed proportional to population.
7 The interpretation of a $20/tC emission abatement policy and 5 per cent effective
development aid is maintained below. Readers who prefer more or less stringent
emission abatement or more or less effective development aid should multiply
the ratios reported below with the appropriate factor.
8 About 0.03 per cent of OECD emissions.
9 The Pigouvian tax, that is, the global marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions
at a 1 per cent pure rate of time preference. Note that it is not implied that OECD
emissions would fall by 10 million tC if a tax of $3.8/tC is levied; the carbon price
is defensible from awelfare perspective, while the 10million tC signify just a small
variation around the baseline.
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Figure 2. The return on development aid in Africa relative to emission reduction (for a
climate policy costing $20/tC and a 5 per cent effective development aid) as a function
of the parameters that govern the sensitivity of climate change impacts to economic
development
In the second transfer, only $18 million10 is given in development aid. In
the third transfer, $21 million11 is given in development, this time dis-
tributed proportional to the regional marginal costs. Each of the four
developing regions clearly prefers to receive aid rather than see greenhouse
gas emissions reduced.
The ﬁgures in table 2 are very uncertain. A large number of assumptions
underlie these estimates, including future developments, the climate
sensitivity, the sensitivity of society to climate change, and the sensitivity
of vulnerability to development. Agriculture, water resources, energy
consumption, and human health are the most important impacts for
developing countries. Figure 2 displays a sensitivity analysis around the
parameters that govern the sensitivity of these sectors to development.
These parameters are the per capita income elasticity of the demand for
energy, water, and agriculture, and the relationship between wealth, on the
one hand, and age structure, urbanization, and infectious diseases, on the
other. These seven parameters are varied with one standard deviation from
the mean. The return to development aid for Africa relative to the return to
emission reduction for a $20/tC emission abatement policy and a 5 per cent
effective development aid is not very sensitive to these parameters, except
for the expansion of water demand with economic growth and the rate
of penetration of air conditioning. Even then, the return on aid varies not
more than 25 per cent from the base value. For a $20/tC emission reduction
policy, 5 per cent effective aid, and a rapid penetration of air conditioning,
Africa would prefer investment in emission abatement to investment in
10 $1.8/tC is the marginal damage cost to the developing regions.
11 $2.1/tC is the marginal damage cost to Africa and Latin America.
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Figure 3. The return on development aid in Africa relative to emission reduction (for a
climate policy costing $20/tC and a 5 per cent effective development aid) as a function
of the baseline scenario; also shown is the assumed average growth rate of per capita
income in Africa in the twenty-ﬁrst century and the Autonomous Energy Efﬁciency
Improvement (AEEI)
development aid; for all other sensitivity analyses, and for more ambitious
emission reduction policy, the reverse would be true. Other regions have
similar sensitivities (results not shown). For other discount rates, the picture
is similar too (results not shown).
Figure 3 displays the sensitivity to the baseline scenario of the return on
development aid relative to emission abatement, for Africa, for a $20/tC
emission reduction policy, 5 per cent effective aid, and a 1 per cent pure
rate of time preference. Results are presented for 11 scenarios. The FUND
scenario is the basis. Three older IPCC scenarios are used, viz. IS92a
(business as usual), IS92d (low emissions), and IS92f (high emissions); see
Leggett et al. (1992). The four newer IPCC scenarios are also used, viz.
A1, A2, B1, and B2 with three variants on A1 namely A1C, A1G, and
A1T; see Nakicenovic and Swart (2001). The return on development aid
relative to emission reduction ranges from 0.82 to 1.44 for an emission
abatement policy of $20/tC and 5 per cent effective aid: Only under IS92d
and SRES A1G does Africa prefer investments in emission reduction over
investments in development aid; for more ambitious emission reduction
policies, Africa always prefers development aid. The differences in outcome
between the scenarios can be to some extent explained from the differences
in the assumed growth rates of per capita income, also displayed in ﬁgure 3.
Development pays less than does emission reduction if the economic
growth rate is high. The intuition behind this scenario dependence is clear,
and the same as that behind the differences between the developing regions.
Development aidhelps the least developed themost.However, the assumed
rate of technological progress matters as well. Figure 3 also shows the
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Figure 4. The return on development aid in Africa relative to emission reduction (for a
climate policy costing $20/tC and a 5 per cent effective development aid) as a function
of the severity of selected climate change impacts
average AEEI in Africa in the twenty-ﬁrst century; a low AEEI has the
opposite effect of a high growth rate. With a high AEEI, the costs of air
conditioning fall, and the impacts of climate change become less sensitive
to the growth rate of the economy (cf. ﬁgure 2). The picture is similar for
other climate policies, regions, and discount rates (results not shown).
Figure 4 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis on the impacts of
climate change in Africa, again focussing on a $20/tC emission reduction
policy, a 5 per cent effective development aid policy, and using a pure
rate of time preference of 1 per cent. The effects on energy consumption,
water resources, agriculture, vector-borne diseases, and cardiovascular
and respiratory mortality and morbidity are increased and decreased by
50 per cent. The return on development aid in Africa is least sensitive
to the assumed impact on heating energy and agriculture, followed by
water resources, cooling energy, vector-borne diseases, and cardiovascular
and respiratory disorders. The return on development aid falls below one
only if vector-borne diseases increases much less with climate change than
expected, or if cardiovascular and respiratory diseases increasemuchmore.
With less vector-borne diseases, the impacts of climate change become
less sensitive to development. This is reverse for cardiovascular disorder
because the dynamics of cold-related deaths dominate in the short run,
also in Africa. The picture is similar for other climate policies, regions, and
discount rates (results not shown).
4. Discussion and conclusion
The above analysis shows that, for the period 2000–2009, investing in
development, particularly in the poorest countries, may well be a better
strategy for reducing the impacts of climate change than is greenhouse
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gas emission reduction.12 This conclusion is in line with the ﬁndings of
Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001), the only other paper on this subject. Regional
comparisons and sensitivity analyses shows that this is particularly the
case if development aid targets vector-borne infectious diseases and water
resources; the result does not varymuchwith thediscount rate.With generic
development aid, the gains in water resources and infectious diseases
would be partly offset by increases in energy consumption for cooling
and cardiovascular diseases. The policy conclusion would be that money
spent on reducing exposure (greenhouse gas emissions) for the sake of
poverty-related climate change impacts is better spent on alleviating those
vulnerabilities directly.
This paper does not address the trade-off between environmental
protection anddevelopment in general, or evenbetween emission reduction
and development aid. The paper is restricted to comparing two strategies
to reduce the impact of climate change. Broader questions are obviously
important, but would require a more extensive model than the current
version of FUND. The conclusions are also restricted to policies in the
current decade; the results of the current model may well be different for
later periods, so that analyses like these should be repeated with up-to-date
knowledge.
The conclusions drawn from this paper should be treated with caution.
After all, despite the extensive sensitivity analyses, the ﬁndings are based
on one single model. Given the importance of vector-borne diseases and
water resources in the results, the results should be further investigated
with more detailed models of these sectors, and more detailed models of
the delivery of foreign aid.
Other authors (Cline, 1992; Fankhauser, 1995; Mendelsohn et al., 2000;
Nordhaus, 1994) have estimated other climate change impacts per region
and per sector; this would lead to different results, at least quantitatively
but perhaps also qualitatively. These studies, however, have a less dynamic
speciﬁcation of the relationship between development and vulnerability,
and therefore do not readily lend themselves to analyses as in this paper.
This paper puts spending on greenhouse gas emission reduction in
a broader context, and demonstrates that that may change the conclusions.
In a narrow sense, cutting greenhouse gas emissions helps alleviating
malaria and water shortage. In a broader sense, the same money can be
spent differently to alleviate climate-change-induced malaria and water
shortage even more. Only by considering the broader question can we
decide how much effort should be expended on greenhouse gas emission
abatement.
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